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On the Difficulties of Writing Philosophy 
from a Racialized Subjectivity 
Grant J. Silva 
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY 
This essay is about the loss of voice.1 It is about the ways 
in which the act of writing philosophy often results in an 
alienating and existentially meaningless experience for 
many budding philosophers, particularly those who wish 
to think from their racialized and gendered identities in 
professional academic philosophy (and still come out 
with a job or obtain tenure!). Unless one actively resists 
and consciously tries to keep sight of who they are 
while philosophizing—which means being true to one’s 
interests, writing on topics that they find fascinating 
(regardless of their disciplinary uptake), and relying upon 
ways of knowing informed by the particularities of human 
identity, to say the least—professionalized philosophy has 
a tendency to disembody its practitioners. It can, as Kurt 
Cobain sings, “beat me out of me.” This disembodiment is 
strange since most philosophy, especially since Socrates, 
begins under the banner of “know thy self.” How are we 
to understand this “self” that philosophy ask us to know, 
when, for many, any attempt at using logos to think about 
ethnos results in nonphilosophy? Ultimately, as I suggest, 
the act of writing philosophy often amounts to a sleight of 
hand, one resulting in the alienation, estrangement, and 
eventual replacement of one sense of self with another that 
may not really be you. 
Contrary to this, I suggest that you be yourself in 
professional philosophy, especially if you are a racial or 
ethnic minority. Note, however, that this suggestion does 
not imply that one is (nor should they be) altogether defined 
by their gender, race, or ethnicity in terms of their ability to 
think. While there remains something to be said about the 
inability of controlling how one’s colleagues or society at 
large views you, that is, the inescapability of a racialized 
existence, to demand that all philosophers who happen 
to be of “minority” status think in essentialized ways that 
correspond with race and/or gender would be an injustice 
and quite the totalizing experience. Such a strong stance 
would deny many philosophers their status as philosopher 
plain and simple (not a “Black,” “Latinx,” or what-have-you 
philosopher). For that reason, my suggestion aims at those 
who hold that one’s race or ethnic identity is completely 
irrelevant or out of place in philosophy; it is aimed at those 
who would devalue the epistemic importance of race, 
ethnicity, or gender altogether. 
In order to give shape to this line of thought, I ask the 
following question: What does philosophy have to do with 
you? Or, perhaps more precisely, what do you have to 
do with philosophy? Such a question routinely kick-starts 
my Latin American philosophy course. It is a question 
that students (both undergraduate and graduate) often 
have a hard time answering, regardless of their ethnic or 
racial background, sexuality, or gender. It is also one that 
philosophers do not ask enough (or at all for that matter). 
I start my course in this way because, as I see it, whatever 
“Latin American” or “Latinx” philosophy might be, it is part 
of the embodiment of philosophy, a movement (for lack of 
a better word) that has found new meaning in professional 
philosophy and is part of a process that says who you are 
matters philosophically. 
To call oneself a “Latin American philosopher,” or, 
perhaps more specifically, to philosophize from a Latin 
American or Latinx standpoint, is to affirm the importance 
of one’s Latinidad—whatever that might mean—while 
doing philosophy. This is quite the political statement in 
mainstream academic philosophy. In a discipline that 
has for the most part been dominated by white males, 
both thematically and methodologically, to think from a 
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nonwhite or nonmale perspective grates against the grain 
of much professional academic philosophy. Moreover, to 
regard one’s Latinidad as a site for knowledge-construction 
and/or philosophical analysis is to ascribe epistemic value 
to race or gender or the intersection of these (and more). 
How you know is impacted by who you are. Charles Mills 
puts it best when he writes that because of the centrality of 
whiteness to professional philosophy’s self-conception, a 
point I explain below, those wishing to think from nonwhite 
perspectives are “challenging philosophy in a way that 
Black scholars in other areas are not challenging theirs.”2 
Not only should philosophers embrace this challenge, but 
if philosophy is to thrive today, attract more students from 
a variety of backgrounds, and survive in higher education, 
it must. Problem is, many would rather sink the ship than 
keep it afloat. 
DISEMBODIED PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 
The disembodiment of philosophy comes from 
certain methodological constraints, metaphilosophical 
commitments, and normative ideals about the end goal of 
philosophical thought. When first introducing philosophy 
to students unfamiliar with it, professors and instructors 
oftentimes fall back upon the transliteration of the Greek 
work philosophia as the “love of wisdom.” Given the 
meaning of the particles philo and sophia, these professors 
and instructors are not wrong when reducing philosophy 
to such an easily digestible cliché (I, too, am guilty of 
reaching for this formula when I am having a hard time 
explaining what philosophy is and what philosophers do). 
Nevertheless, as I argue below, to think of philosophy 
as merely the love of wisdom is an impoverishment and 
understatement. First off, most people understand being 
wise as synonymous with being knowledgeable, and 
knowledge is not necessarily the same as wisdom. I can 
know a great deal; that does not make me wise. Wisdom is 
critical insight or a disposition towards knowing/knowledge 
that may accompany the state of being knowledgeable, but 
it also might not. Socrates purported to know nothing or 
very little but was said to be wise. Loving wisdom does not 
mean a collection of facts. Second, the loving of wisdom 
was never meant to be an end in itself; no one loves wisdom 
simply for the sake of loving wisdom (that would be weird). 
Philosophers aspire after wisdom because it frees one 
from obscurantism, ignorance, dogma, falsehood, and 
various forms of ideology and false-consciousness that 
support social and political institutions (many of which 
happen to be unjust). Thus, there is an inherent liberatory 
quality to philosophy, as Ignacio Ellacuría put it (again, see 
below), one that extends all the way to Western academic 
understandings of the origins of this field. 
Philosophy is also often described as the universal science 
of thought, a rigorous and critical examination of “how 
things in the broadest sense of the term hang together in 
the broadest sense of the term,” to use the famous quote 
by Wilfred Sellars. Here, philosophy is the province of “big 
questions.” While a precise definition might be untenable, 
most philosophers agree that their discipline asks important 
questions about life, death, right, wrong, good and bad, the 
existence of God, the nature of religious belief, the extent 
of human knowledge, the meaning of life, and a whole lot 
more. In order to ask “big questions,” however, one has 
to achieve sufficient discursive breadth, that is, a way of 
speaking, thinking, and writing that places you on the same 
page as the great thinkers of history, e.g., Plato, Augustine, 
Descartes, Kant, and others. From this perspective, the 
practice of philosophy requires that we think in a way that 
transcends human difference, in a way that arises above 
the particularities of our individual or collective historical 
and cultural contexts such that our thoughts speak across 
the ages and ask questions pertaining to all of humanity, 
not just our individual self or subset of humanity. 
The problem with such a conception of philosophy is 
that in being asked to write, speak, and think in a way 
that spans space and time, students of philosophy are 
often forced to downplay or drop those aspects of their 
selves that tend to be rather meaningful on individual 
(and collective) levels. Worse, since achieving the widest 
discursive breadth possible often comes by finding a 
common (read “universal”) ground, budding philosophers 
are often forced to speak in terms articulated by those of 
the dominant perspective(s). This is the particular knot that 
I wish readers think to about: the downplaying of racial or 
ethnic difference and the simultaneous embracement of a 
supposed “race-less” disembodied voice. 
In “Philosophy Raced, Philosophy Erased,” Mills identifies
the pervasive whiteness of professionalized philosophy as
the root of this problem.3 As he explains, philosophers of
color face an assortment of challenges upon entering the
ranks of professional philosophy. Some of these include
implicit and explicit racial/gender biases, microaggressions,
double standards, forms of tokenization, and outright
hostility or animosity. All of these, unfortunately, have come
to be expected by racialized minorities entering academic
philosophy (which does not make them right). Professional
philosophers can rectify the above if the political will and
various administrative and institutional support mechanisms
are in place. Sadly, both tend to be lacking (but that is a
different matter). The most perplexing and unique challenge
faced by philosophers of color, Mills continues, is the
relegation of the types of interpersonal, structural, and
historical issues faced by racialized minorities to the status
of “nonphilosophy.” In particular, Mills has in mind issues
revolving around race, but one can easily add related
concepts, historical events, or phenomena such as racism,
sexism, colonization, slavery, various types of objectification
and denigration, political marginalization, economic
exploitation (as women and/or people of color), and more. 
In comparison to other fields, such as literature, sociology, 
or history, philosophy aspires to ask perennial questions. 
“Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from 
the contingent, the corporeal, the temporal, the material, 
to get at necessary, spiritual, eternal, ideal truth,” writes 
Mills.4 From this perspective, the range of questions that 
fall into the domain of philosophy ought not to include 
those that lack broad appeal. Questions devoted to race 
and processes of racialization, therefore, are of limited 
relevance to “philosophers” on account of them being 
“local,” particular, too corporeal (as it were), and mostly 
of interest to “minorities.” It is not that white philosophers 
altogether lack interest in any of the above concerns. Instead, 
Mills’s analysis centers on the way questions connected to 
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race or processes of racialization are considered “applied” 
issues, “special topics,” perhaps even “non-ideal theory,” 
or whatever term is used to confer peripheral, tangential, 
outlier-status as not really philosophy. 
A major reason for this marginalization is the fact that the 
hegemonic group of individuals traditionally viewed as 
“philosophers” lack the range of perspective often shared 
by people of color. To make matters worse, this group 
also inhabits a position of racialized normativity. Using 
political philosophy as an example, Mills explains that the 
experiential starting point for people of color, generally 
speaking, runs contrary to the basic assumptions about 
political subjectivity maintained by many “mainstream” 
thinkers. He writes, “Your moral equality and personhood 
are certainly not recognized; you are not equal before 
the law; and the state is not seeking to protect but to 
encroach upon your interests in the interests of the white 
population.”5 In the context of the United States’s racial 
imaginary, African Americans are fundamentally viewed as 
criminal and dangerous; the existence of Latinx peoples 
is predicated on tropes of “illegality.” While the rights 
of Blacks, Hispanics, and even Native Americans (via 
treaty) might be protected nominally, these protections 
are not automatically granted in our society but must 
be continuously fought for and asserted, a point that 
gives new meaning to the idea of racial privilege. All 
this is to say, a metaphysically stable and legally secure 
political subjectivity is something philosophers can take 
for granted only when the class of individuals who make 
up professional philosophy are treated the same way by 
the law, show up in similar manners in terms of political 
representation, and also share the same normative 
concerns. Thus, when relying upon one’s (white racial) self 
as a frame of reference for discussion of rights or political 
organization, it is quite possible that, in academic contexts 
with other philosophers who share the same racialized 
starting point, the particularity of your view is obscured and 
the experience of “unraced” whites becomes the norm, as 
Mills puts it. 
I offer the question of political justice as it relates to 
undocumented immigrants or irregular migration as 
another example. At the onset of A Theory of Justice, John 
Rawls, arguably the most important political philosopher in 
the twentieth century, writes that his main object of inquiry 
is justice, the basic structure of society.6 Seeking a simple 
conception of justice, Rawls limits his project in two ways 
(one of which is important here): “I shall be satisfied if it is 
possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice 
for the basic structure of society conceived for the time 
being as a closed system isolated from other societies.”7 In 
The Law of Peoples, he adds “this position views society as 
closed: persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death.”8 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls continues: “That a society is 
closed is a considerable abstraction, justified only because 
it enables us to speak about certain main questions free 
from distracting details.”9 Besides viewing the plight of 
undocumented peoples in places like the United States as 
a “distracting detail,” Rawls’s restriction betrays his own 
principles by providing too much information regarding 
the persons behind the famed “veil of ignorance.” When 
formulating the basic principles upon which the structure 
of society will depend, we may not know if we are rich, 
poor, Black, white, able-bodied or not, male or female, gay 
or straight, but we do know that everyone behind the veil 
will be a citizen or, at the very least, have regular status. 
Through this restriction Rawls limits justice, in its most 
basic form, to those who are formal members of the body 
politic, a move that alienates upwards of twelve million 
undocumented people from the basic structure of society 
(i.e., justice). Unless such a limitation is justifiable, which 
is to say that the burden is upon Rawlsians to show how 
this is not an arbitrary starting point for a theory of justice 
(again, appealing to Rawls’s own standards), how can the 
range of justice, in its most basic form, be so narrow? 
My goal is not to engage the burgeoning literature on the 
ethics of immigration when I ask the above question—a 
question that many Rawlsians and political philosophers 
will dismiss as an instance in “non-ideal theory” (yet another 
means of downplaying the unique philosophical challenges 
posed by undocumented or irregular immigration). Instead, 
building upon Mills’s point, my goal is to demonstrate how 
many of the assumptions that “mainstream” philosophy 
depends upon, like taking citizenship (or, even more 
abstractly, “membership”) for granted when constructing 
a theory of justice, reflect a rather particular perspective 
which shapes a specific set of normative concerns. Now, 
imagine this happening in the aggregate, adding things 
like prestige, the weight of tradition, and the “need for 
rigor” into the mix. One can easily see how many of those 
intellectual endeavors that might attract and welcome 
more nonwhite people into philosophy—and, again, this is 
not to say that philosophers of color are only interested 
in “projects of color,” so to speak—are jettisoned (I am 
tempted to say “deported”) to ethnic studies, area studies, 
women and gender studies, etc. 
It is important to underscore that it is not merely the 
numerical overrepresentation of whites that leads to the 
alienation of minorities in philosophy. Mills’s ultimate 
concern is with gate-keeping methodological constraints 
and “border-building” tactics that simultaneously curtail 
the diversification of philosophy as well as obscure the 
particularity of those concerns by passing themselves 
off as “universal.” Through this process, professional 
philosophy remains overpopulated by white people (men 
in particular) and dominated by white interests passing 
themselves off as race-less philosophical concerns. To put 
it differently, if philosophy is the “science of thought,” as a 
“science” it depends on a particular method. Such method 
does not come from nowhere but is produced by specific 
philosophers in particular places and points in time. In the 
context of professional academic philosophy, this means 
students are asked to speak, write, and think in ways that 
historically make sense within a methodological context 
articulated predominantly by dead white men. 
Indeed, as one can probably realize, there is no such thing 
as an objective, impartial “view from nowhere,” a point 
that sets up quite an interesting predicament: either way 
one goes about it, one cannot avoid philosophizing from 
a particularized perspective; it is either yours or that of the 
dominant point of view passing itself off as universal. I ask, 
why not choose to be you when you philosophize? 
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LIBERATING PHILOSOPHY: ON WHY I FAST
PHILOSOPHICALLY 
For many individuals attempting to philosophize from 
racialized identities, philosophy can (and should) mean so 
much more than the above. At the very least, it should help 
liberate the mind as well as the body. Problem is, the former 
is typically viewed as exclusive to philosophy, the locus of 
our freedom and volition (if such things exist), while the latter 
is obviously important, but a contingent and accidental fact 
about you. For racialized “minorities,” however, seemingly 
adding new significance to Glaucon’s argument in The 
Republic that the semblance of being a good person is 
more important than actually being good, one cannot take 
their corporeal existence lightly. How you look in the eyes 
of others can result in life or death. Unfortunately, as this 
essay explains, most academic philosophy takes place from 
a perspective of great privilege, where how one appears 
or looks to others is irrelevant (and, moreover, should
be irrelevant when it comes to philosophy). The kinds of 
questions that philosophers ask (i.e., “big questions”) 
take for granted a philosophical subjectivity that is more 
or less secure. Freedom of mind, thought, and conscience 
are prerequisite and assumed outright. For women, racial 
minorities, colonized peoples (and those whose sense of 
self begins from a position of oppression) such a starting 
point is a luxury. To think from these perspectives means 
one cannot help but use philosophy for the sake of freedom. 
Think about it in terms of hunger. When you are hungry 
all you can do is think about food (the stuff of Snickers 
commercials). Once you are satiated, when you have eaten, 
then you are capable of entertaining and contemplating 
abstract philosophical questions (those about God, life, 
death, good and bad, etc.). Philosophy, to continue with 
this metaphor, often begins from the point of view of 
persons stuffed to the gills! To philosophize in a way where 
you matter, the racialized and gendered you, means that 
one uses philosophy such that it resembles “the love of 
wisdom,” but more so in terms of how wisdom sets us 
free from misguided and hubristic ways of knowing. Along 
these lines, in “The Liberating Function of Philosophy,” an 
essay that has become an important point of departure for 
much of my work, Ellacuría writes, 
We can say that philosophy has always had to do 
with freedom, though in different ways. It has 
been assumed that philosophy is the task of free 
individuals and free peoples, free at least of the 
basic needs that can suppress the kind of thinking 
we call philosophy. We also acknowledge that it has 
a liberating function for those who philosophize 
and that as the supreme exercise of reason, it has 
liberated people from obscurantism, ignorance, 
and falsehood. Throughout the centuries, from 
the pre-Socratics to the Enlightenment, through 
all methods of critical thinking, we have ascribed 
a great superiority to reason, and to philosophical 
reason in particular, as a result of its liberating 
function. 
He continues, “[T]his matter of philosophy and freedom gets 
to the fundamental purpose of philosophical knowledge, 
which even if it is understood as a search for truth, cannot 
be reduced to being a search for truth for its own sake.”10 
We should appreciate philosophy for its liberatory potential. 
How is this liberatory potential cut short when sexual, 
racial, and political oppression are not viewed as proper 
or “traditional” philosophical topics? Moreover, given that 
philosophy as a discipline seemingly thrives when written 
in the guise of dialogues, how is this field needlessly 
restrained when it delineates the range of perspective to 
sanctified, hegemonic perspectives that speak on behalf 
of all of humanity? 
While philosophy might survive in the above described ways, 
it surely will not thrive. In addition to its institutionalized 
formulations, philosophy must shift from an erudite “love 
of wisdom,” a benchmark on the register of Western civility, 
to a process in which “the telos of thinking, if there is any, 
is the struggle against dehumanization, understood as the 
affirmation of sociality and the negation of its negation 
[coloniality],” to quote Nelson Maldonado-Torres.11 That is 
to say, philosophy is not an end in itself but part of the 
struggle against multiple forms of dehumanization and 
oppression. It is the affirmation of sociality and the denial 
of antisocial behavior. Philosophy ought not only to free 
one from misuses of reason or the type of intellectual 
laziness from which all humans suffer, but it also should 
be used to liberate ourselves from the types of intellectual 
nonage imposed by social injustice, racial and gendered 
totalization, and oppression. In using philosophy to think 
about the particularities of human existence, we should 
philosophize as hungry persons. Again, I ask, how are you
(i.e., the person you are, your identity, your race, gender, 
ethnicity, or nationality) relevant to philosophy? 
I conclude with the prayer, as he refers to it, Frantz Fanon 
uses to end Black Skin, White Mask: “O my body, always 
make of me a man who questions!”12 I find these words to be 
hauntingly bothersome and yet extremely fascinating and 
important. I am bothered by them not because I dislike this 
statement. Being a man of color in professional academic 
philosophy, I often find myself often repeating Fanon’s 
prayer as a mantra. This passage is perplexing, however, 
because it comes at the end of a book devoted to thinking 
through the significance of the Black body, in a way that 
sees it burdened by negative valuations and internalized 
displeasure. To paraphrase what Fanon writes at the onset 
of The Wretched of the Earth, decolonization results in 
a new humanism, a novel social order, one in which the 
relations of domination that define the meaning of “white” 
and “Black” today are destroyed and constructed anew; the 
replacement of one species of humankind with another. 
Along these lines, the above prayer signifies Fanon’s 
attempt at finding value in his Black body in the midst of 
a world that devalues it. In these words, Fanon recognizes 
his Black body as enabling philosophical reflection, just the 
type of attitude towards race and processes of racialization 
I advocate for in this essay. 
Nevertheless, for one’s body to become the source of 
philosophical skepticism, it has to inhabit the site of 
social exclusion. It has to bear the mark of difference and 
run against the racial, gender, and sexual normativity of 
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one’s social structure. If not “different,” one will not be 
afforded the looks, the bewilderment, the fear, the gaze 
that generates the level of self-awareness leading to the 
type of questioning that Fanon is grateful for. Along these 
lines, I, too, am grateful for being different (especially in 
philosophy, to say the least). Being a nonwhite Latino, 
I recall (as a child, mind you) the feeling and shame of 
not being “American.” Although I was born in the United 
States and hold US citizenship, I distinctively remember 
thinking that if you closed your eyes and pictured the 
ideal “American,” a brown-skinned boy from the east side 
of Los Angeles would not be the first picture that came 
to mind. The American imaginary remains thoroughly 
racialized, gendered, regionalized (say, coming from 
the Midwest or East Coast), linguistically impoverished 
(that is, monolingual), overly Christian, and heterosexual 
(and I’m sure there is more). Being Hispanic, Latino, or 
Latinx, whichever one prefers, allowed me the epistemic 
vantagepoint to question what it means to be “American,” 
a citizen of the United States. For me, membership is not 
something I take lightly. 
And yet, for such a proclivity to questioning to be possible, 
the racial normativity that accompanies white supremacy 
had to have come into effect (and this is where I am 
bothered by Fanon’s words). I often worry about those 
times in which whiteness or white supremacy becomes 
necessary, where we find some meaning in the existence 
of whiteness. Here, this worry about constructing a 
theodicy for whiteness is inspired by what Aimé Césaire 
writes in Discourse on Colonialism: “[B]etween colonization 
and civilization there is an infinite distance; that out of all 
the colonial expeditions that have been undertaken, out of 
all the colonial statutes that have been drawn up, out of 
all the memoranda that have been dispatched by all the 
ministries, there could not come a single human value.”13 
For these reasons, my nonwhite body should not be the 
means through which I approach philosophy. However, it 
is, and as such, my approach to philosophy does not end 
with enlightenment, but liberation. 
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